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Abstract--A l inear~uadrat ic differential game with infinite dimensional state space is considered. The 
system state is affected by disturbance and both players have access to different measurements. Optimal 
linear strategies for the pursuer and the evader, when they exist, are explicitly determined. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
We consider a two-person pursuit-evasion differential game with infinite dimensional state space 
in which both the system state and the measurements are corrupted by noises. The feature that 
the players have access to different noisy measurements makes the problem already hard for the 
corresponding lumped-parameter case. This was solved directly in Bagchi and Oisder[l] by 
introducing new state variables with values in Hilbert space and converting the original problem 
to an optimization problem with an infinite dimensional state space. Other approaches to the 
problem may be found in [2] and [3] and numerical aspects are discussed in [4]. We extend here the 
method proposed in [1] to solve the two-person stochastic pursuit~evasion differential game for 
distributed parameter systems. 
Section 2 starts with some basic formalisms used here on linear partial differential equations and 
formulates the problem in this framework. In the class of linear strategies, the problem is 
reformulated in Section 3 into an optimization problem in a different function space. This is solved 
in Section 4 and representations of the control gain operators arising in the solutions are given 
in Section 5. The conventional Brownian motion model is used, as opposed to the finitely additive 
white noise model used in [1]. 
2. MATHEMATICAL  PREL IMINARIES  AND 
PROBLEM FORMULATION 
Let Vand H be two Hilbert spaces, VcH, V dense in H; let Ih" II and I '1 denote the norms in 
V and H and ( - ,  • ) the scalar product in H. We identify H with its antidual. With V' denoting 
the antidual of V, 
VcHcV '  
where we assume that the injection of V into H is compact. 
Let - A e L (V; V') be an operator satisfying 
(A-1)-(Aq~,q~)~>~I[lqSN 2 and (A4,,4,)~<c~2llq~ll 2 V4,eV, 
with 
7~>0, ~,>0 
• ) denotes the duality between V and V'. (fL .N, P) is a complete probability space and where ( ' ,  
T denotes the time interval (0, tt). Let Hn be another Hilbert Space and W(t) be a Wiener process 
in H n with covariance operator ~ '  nuclear. We consider the following equation describing the 
evolution of the system in state space: 
(x(/) ,qS)--(xo,4))= (Ax(z ) ,~b)dr+ (Bpup(r)+Beuo(r),fh)dr+(FW(t),4)) VdpeV (l) 
where up and ue are the strategies of the pursuer and the evader, respectively, and they belong to 
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L2(~ ") × T: H~), H. another separable Hilbert space; Bo, B~ L_(H~; H) are Hilbert-Schmidt and 
F~ / (H , ;  H). Without loss of generality, we assume that xo ~ N(.%, P0), 20 = 0. 
The observations available to the pursuer and the evader are, respectively, 
f, f, Yo(t) = Cox(z) dr + G o dVo(z ) (2a) ) ) 
fj c Y~(t) = Gx( r )  dr + ae dV~.(r) (2h) d0 
where Vp(t) and V~(t) are vector-valued independent Wiener processes on Nm~ and N'o, respectively, 
with covariance matrices ~; and Y~; Y~, "~; ~, G 0, G~ /_(Nm0; ¢~, ~ t G~, Gc~e/ (N"q ;  
C o e / (H ;  N'~) and C~ e / (H ;  Nm~). Under the preceding assumptions, one can prove that 
x e L2(~; C(T; H)NL2(T; V)), Ype L2(~; C(T; []~mp), y~eL2(f~; C(T; ~"~). (3) 
We assume, from now on, that the strategies Up(t) and ue(t), for fixed t, are linear functionals 
of the observations Yo(s), 0 ~< s ~< t, and Y~(s), 0 <<. s ~ t, respectively: 
up(t)= Np(t,z)dYp(r) (4a) 
) 
f' ue(t) = Ne(t,z)dY~(z) (4b) 0 
where, for each r ~< t, Np(t, r) ~ / (N'~; H,,), N~(t, r) e Z_ (N"¥; H,), 8Np(t, • )/8~ e L2(T; /_ (N"~; H,) 
and 8Ne(t," )/~r e L : (T ;  (N"~;H,)). Within this class of control strategies, we want to determine 
the minimax solution 
sup infE{J} 
u c Up 
where 
1 .f" { IQx(t)12 + IRpu°(t)P~" -IR~uc(t)l~,,, } dt (5) 
with Rp, Re positive definite operators in Z_(Hu; Hu} and Q a nonnegative definite Hilbert Schmidt 
operator from H into itself. 
We assume throughout hat both players know and have perfect recall as to the system 
characteristics: 
{A, B o,B e, Co, Co, F, G v, Ge, 20, Po, 4;  "f';, ~,  Q, Rp, Re } 
and also as to their own past measurements and controls. 
3. REFORMULATION IN A D IFFERENT STATE SPACE 
Let us introduce new state variables 
~(t)(s)&x(t As) 
q0(t)(s) ~ GpdVp, ~lc(t)(s)~ G~dV c (6) 
) ) 
where t A s ~min(t, s). We convert our original problem into two optimal control problems. First 
assume that Ne(t, z) is fixed and determine the optimal Up(t) which, of course, will be expressed 
in terms of Ne(t, r). The form of up(t) given by (4a) will then express N o as a function of N,.. 
Interchanging the roles of up and u~, we obtain two implicit functional relations for the two 
unknowns Np and N~. If this pair of equations has a unique solution, there exists a unique 
saddle-point of the pursuit-evasion game formulated in Section 2 in the class of strategies given 
by (4a,b). Let us now proceed with the above-mentioned scheme. 
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Suppose that Ne(r, z) is given. Then 
f0 ;0 u¢(t) = N~(t,r)C~x(~)d~ + Ne(t,~)G~dV~(r) 
fo = N¢(t, ~)C~r~(t)(z) dr + N~(t, t)rl~(t)(t) 
f '(~N¢(t, 
- j0 \  ~z) ) t /¢ ( t ) ( r )dz .  (7) 
Using the relation rl¢(t)(t)= t/e(t)(tr) and defining 
• ( I , s>~z,  
equation (1) can be rewritten as 
fl f0( fo ) (n(t)(s),dp)-(n(O)(s),q~)= (AIs~n(~)(s),c~)dT + B¢I~ N¢(z,a)Cen(r)(a)da, c ~ dr 
' * ON¢(r ,  a )  
+fo(B js , (N~(z ,z ) t l¢ ( , , ( ty , - - fo ( .~a  ) r/¢(r)(a) da) ,  q~) dr 
and 
(;0 + (Bp!~,up(r), dp) dr + Is~F 
Furthermore, we clearly have 
dW(r), ~b), V~b ~ V. (8) 
r/¢(t)(s) = L,G~ dV¢(r) (9) 
Yp(t) = Cp~(z)(tl)dz + Gp dVp(z). (i0) 
Let I~ be the Lebesgue-Stieltjes measure on [0, T] which is the Lebesgue measure together with 
unit masses concentrated at t = 0 and t = T. By M2(T; X) we shall mean the space of measurable 
functions from [0, T] into a Hilbert space X such that 
o r Ilfll ~ d# < ~.  
This is a Hilbert space under the inner product 
[f, g] × = (f(ts), g(ty))× + (f(0), g(0))× + (f(s), g(s))× ds 
where ( -, • )× denotes the inner product in X. On the other hand, let #f be the Lebesgue-Stieltjes 
measure on [t, T], for fixed t ~ T, which is the Lebesgue measure there with unit mass concentrated 
at s = T. We drop the suffix Xwhen X = H. By M2((t, ty]; V) we shall mean the space of measurable 
functions f from [t, T] into V such that 
tT lflZvdpf < o0. 
Now equation (8) can be represented as 
[~( t ) ,  ~]  - [~t(0), ~] 
f0 ;o fo = [(AI,~rt(t),(a)]dz + [B¢I., N¢(r,a)C~n(r)(a)da, q~]dr 
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where 
' ~ aN~(~,  
+ fo tBO,~(No(z. ~),o(r)(t~.)- fo (- a))q¢(z)(a)dcr), ¢] dr 
; [fo ] + [&Ludr),C,]dt+ Z~rdW(z),¢ V~ME(T; V)nM~(T;H) 
Theorem 3.1 
With the preceding notations, 
qe ~ L2(~; C(T; M2(T; ~"~))) (14) 
and 
~ L:(~; C(T; MZ(T; H))NL2(T; M2((t, t/]; V))). (15) 
Proof. From equation (13), it is easy to show that 
f ~/e (t) 17~:cr: nmo) = (1 +tr--t) G~dVe(z + G0 d V~(r) ds. 
m~. iw % 
Applying the Martingale inequality, (14) can be established. 
On the other hand, we have 
El0 ] B~I.~ N~(z, a)C~rc(r)(a) da, re(r) ~< const. Jrr (r) I~u~lr: m (16) 
and 
, 
)lM2(r:~,,~l+lTz(r) ]clr:m+ ~ ~a da . (17) 
Furthermore, from (A-l), it follows that 
f f  
- [ (A I  ~Tr(r), re(z))] = -(Arc(z)(t,),  rc(r)(b) - (Arc(r)(s), rr(r)(s)) ds 
f[ 
~>cql~(T)(tr)l~+~. I~(Q(s)l~ds>~.ln(T)~:,~.,,l:~, ~. (18) 
From the estimates (16), (17), (18) and the well-known results in stochastic differential equations 
(e.g. given in Bensoussan [5]), (15) follows. [] 
Let us now express the criterion in terms of the new state variables. We have, in fact, 
I t , '  { ' - " J =~ Iz(t)x(t)l-M2~r:m IU(t)x(t)l-N. --2(U(t)X(t).)'(t)q~(t))H,, 
, 1 f" , -17(t)q~(tllh,,}dt +~j, IRpup(t)l-H. dt (19) 
} 
fi' ( Aqb,(s ),[(A¢,, ¢2)] - (A¢,( t r ) ,  ¢2(tr)) + (A¢~(0), q~2(0)) + ¢2(s)) ds. (12) 
Equation (9) can also be rewritten as 
If0 ] [qe(t),ck]u~= I~GedVe(z),~ . VCeM2(T. ~m~) (13) ~m c 
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where 
and 
z ( t )  = L,,Q 
U(t)Tt(t)= N~(t,r)C~x(t)(~)dt 
(20a) 
(20b) 
y(t)~lc(t)=Re(Ne(t,t)rle(t)(t~)-flfON~(t'z)x~ . . . .  dT). t (2oc  
The pursuer wants to choose Up(t) so as to minimize the expected value of (19) subject to (l l) and 
(13). 
4. SOLUTION OF THE CONTROL PROBLEM 
In this section, we assume that 
(A-2) )~*(t)Z(t)- U*(t)U(t) is nonnegative definite. 
Under the preceding assumption, by using the stochastic maximum principle, we can obtain the 
necessary and sufficient condition for optimality of u °. 
Theorem 4.1 
The optimal control U°p(t) is characterized by the following variational inequality 
o" {[B°I'(aP(t) - u°(t))' E[qad(t)l ~]]  -- -- u°p(t)), RpU°(t))H, } dt/> 0 a.s. (21) 
VtTp • class of admissible controls, 
where q~/P = a{Yp(S); 0 <<. s ~ t} and q~d(t) is the solution of an adjoint system 
[ q~tt( ] I ; /  ] 
d t) ,  ¢(t) =[(AIt¢(t),qad(t))]+ Bj., N¢(t,a)C~¢(t)(a)da, qad(t) 
+ [Z(t)qS(t), g(t)Tz(t)] - (U(t)O(t), U(t)g(t))Ho -- 2(U(t)ck(t), Y(t)q¢(t))Hu (22a) 
[qad(b), ~b(ts)] = 0 V~b • C(T; M2(T; H))NL2(T; M2((t, tr]; V)). (22b) 
Proof. From (19), we have the following necessary condition for optimality: 
E {[Z(t)z(t), Z(t)rt(t)] - (U(t)z(t), U(t)Tr(t))H, 
- 2(U(t)z(t), 7(t)tle(t))H, }dt + E {Rp(ap(t) - u°(t), Rpu°p(t))H, }dt >1 0 
do 
V~p, u~ e class of admissible controlsf (23) 
where z(t) is the homogeneous solution of (11); i.e. 
dz(t),  ¢(t) l : [ (Ai . ,z(t) ,¢(t)) ]+[Bel . , f~ Ne(t,a)C~z(a)da, qb(t)l 
dt 
+ [Bpl,(ap(t) - U°p(/)), 4~(/)] (24a) 
[z(0), q~(0)] = 0 V~b • C(T; M2(T; H))f3L:(T;  M2((t, tt]); V). (24b) 
fFor precise definition of the class of admissible controls, see Bensoussan [6]. 
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Calculating [z(t), qad(t)] from (22) and (24), equation (23) implies that 
E {BpI,(ap(t) - U°p(t)), q~d (t)] - (Rp(~p(t) - u°p(t)), Rpu°p(t)).. }dt ~> 0. (25) 
do 
Equation (21) can now be easily derived using the properties of conditional expectations. 
Theorem 4.2 
The optimal control u°(t) is determined by 
Proof. From the definition of inner product in M2(T; X), 
[BpZ,(~p(t) - U°p(t)), E[q.d(t)l~.~P,]]dt = (Bp(~p(t) - u~(t)), E[q~d(t)(tl)l~;g~]) 
d0 
f .9 } + • (BpI.,(ap(t)- u°(t)), E[qad(t)(s)l~])ds dt 
do 
f ,, f, (' = (ao( t ) _  o * up(t), Bp (E[q.d(t)(t/)l~P,] + E[q,~d(t)(s)lq/P,]ds)).,, dt. (27) o 
From (21) and (27), we can readily derive (26). D 
Theorem 4.3 
We have 
[E[qad(t)l~P,], 4) (t)] = [~(t)Ept(t)lClP,], 4)(01 + [~(t)E[~l:(t)l~V,], 4)(t)] 
V4) e C(T; M2(T; H))FIL2(T; Me((t, tf]; V)) (28) 
where 
- -~- -q , ,  4)2 = [(AI,4),, .)ff*(t)4)2>] + [<AI,4)2, 3fi(t)4),>] 
and 
[ i0 ]Fc  ] + B:I, N:(t, ~r)C:4)~(t)(a) da, 3ff*(t)4)2 + BeL, N:(t,~r)CeO2(t)(a) dcr,.Y',(t)4), L do 
hi- [)~4)1, Z4)2] -- (U4)I, U4)2)Hu (29a) 
[JTi(tr)4) ~, 4)2] = 0 V4),, 4)2 e C(T; m 2 (T; H))NL2(T; m2((t, tt]; V)) (29b) 
''' ] [ i ,  ] -- "4) , ,4)2 =[(AI.,4)2, Yg2(t)4)1)]+ BeI., Ne(t, cr)Ce4)2(t)(cr)dcr,.~i(t)fh, 
f '  (_SN~ (,,a)']4), ) *2 ] -  2(UO:, 74),),. +[BJ"(N~(t't)4)'(t)(tf)--Jo \ Oa/ I  (')0Y) da)  ' 3if* (z 
[3ffz(zf)4),, 4)2] = 0 V4),, 4)2 E C(T; M2(T; Nmo)) 
(30a) 
(30b) 
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Proof. We assume that the observation oise V 0 is independent of W and rt(0). Define 
7i,(r) = E[rt(z)[~O'~], 0e,(r) = E[r/~(r)l°,0",P], r >~ t
and 
4aa,(~) = E[q,a(~)l~qP,], r >>t t.
From equations (22), (11) and (13), we get 
[-dqad,(r) [B¢I.~ a)C¢4)(r)(a) - L~,4) ]=[<Al¢4) .O .d , (~)>l+ ; No(r, da, O,d,(r) ]
+ [z4), zrt,(r)] - (U4), U~,(r)),,. - 2(U4), ~'~e,(~)).,, 
[qadt ( / f ) ,  4)] = 0 
253 
(31a) 
(31b) 
Id~,(z-) ] 
dr ' 4) = [<AI.~,(,),4)>1 
+[Bel~(N¢(r'r)fl~'(r)(t/)-£: (oNt(~'a)\ Oa  Oe,(r)(a) da) ,  4) ] 
[rt,(t), 4)] = [ED(t)I~,~], 4)] 
(32a) 
(32b) 
and 
k dz '4) Rm~ =0 
[Oet(t), 4)]=me = [E[r/~(t)l~,v], 4)]Rme V4) e C(T; M2(T; []~me)). 
Applying the decoupling method as given in Bensoussan and Viot [7], we have 
0aa,(r) = ~ (t)7~t(r) + .~(/2(t)ri¢,(z), 
where ,~i and ~., are solutions of (29) and (30), respectively. 
Theorem 4.4 
Define 
rt(t) = E[~t(t)l~, v] and fie(t) = E[t/c(t)l?~/~]. 
They are characterized by the following linear estimators: 
t 
+ N~(r, a)C~(z)(a) da, [~(/)' 4)] = fo {[(AI.~(r),¢}] [Bfl. Tf(( 4)] 
/ ~(Rp Rp) BpI. * -tB*{fl(Z)(tt.).k(r)+ :)f'~(r)(tt)O~(z ) 
C 
(33a) 
(33b) 
[] 
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+ (J~(~t (z)(s)~(r) + ,~;(r)(s)O~(r))ds}, 49 dr 
+ [~,(r)C'~(G~t¢G*~) I(dYp(z)- Cpri(z)dr), 49] 
V49 • C(T; M2(T;  H))f3L2(T; M2((t, t,]; v)) (34) 
and 
fo [0e(t), 491em¢ = [~ J~2(z )c* (ap fpG*p) - l (d  Yp('c) - CpTc( ' r )dz) ,  49]a~o 
V49 e C(T;  M2(T; R'o)) (35) 
where ~(t )  and :~(t) are defined by 
[49,, ~(t)492] = E{[49,, ~(t)][r~(t), 49,]} - E{[49,, zi(t)][z~(t), 492]} (36a) 
and 
[49, .~2(t)49,]~.,~ = E{[49, q~(t)l~.,~[rr(t), 49,]} - E{[49, 4~(t)]~,,,~[r~(t), 49 ]} 
V491,49:eC(T;M2(T;H))0L:(T;M2((t,t,]; V)) (36b) 
and 
V49 ~ C(T  ; M2(T; ~m0)). 
ProoJ~ Applying the linear filtering theory in Hilbert spaces, above results are easily 
derived. [] 
Theorem 4.5 
~ and ~: are solutions of the following Riccati equations: 
49,, 492 = [( A l  ,;~,( t)49,, 49:)] + [(AI,491, ;~,(t)49:)] 
+ BoI., N~(t, cr)Cc:~(t)(~)49~dcr, 49 2 + &I. ,  No(t,c~)Cc~,(t)(a)492d~,49, 
) L do 
4- Be l  ~ Ne( t , t )~2( t ) ( t t )~ ,  -- ~ ~ 
+ Bel, N¢(t, t).~2(t)(tt)492-- = 
*) 'Q,~,(t)49,, 49:] - [~, (t)C*(Gp~¢Gp 
~2(t)(~)~1 d~),  ~2 1 
~: (t)(~)492 d~),  49~1 
[~,(o)49,, ~2] Po ¢,(t)(t,) + ¢,(t) (o)  + , ¢2(t)(t,) 
do 
;o ) + 492(t)(0) + 492(t)(s) ds (37b) 
V49t, 492 s C(T; M2(T; H)) fqL:(T; M2((0, tr]; V)) 
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and 
[ ;o  ] +[(AI,ch~,~3(t)(p)]+ B~I, N~(t,r)C~dp~(z)(~)d~,~(t)dp 
+[BeI"(N~(t't)~4(t)(tf)qS-f, laN~(z'a) aa ~(t)(a)~b da) '  qS' 1 
,~2(0) = 0 Vq~ e C(T;  M~(T:  E'~)) 
where ~( t )  is defined by 
255 
(38a) 
(38b) 
t , " * -.I 0 Cp (Gp~pGp) dY(O 
M2((t, t/]; V') x M2(T;  [~,n~)), 
and then there exists a fundamental solution tP(t, G) of the equation dz/dt + ~(t)z = 0 in V' x ~'~. 
Consequently, from (10), (17) and (41), the optimal control u°(t) becomes 
' 0 
u°(t)= -fo(R*Rp)-'B* {(~(t)o(tr) YirE(t)(tf))TJ(t,r)(°~2~ ) ~20(z)) 
+ ,)f~2(t)(s  ~2(z, ) Cp (Gp~ pGp )-' 
(41) z(t) = ~'(z)z(r) dz + 
where the operator .~'(t) belongs to 
L (M2(( t, tr]; V) x M2(T; ~m~); 
[~3(t)~b, ~b,] = [~b, ~2(t)qS~]~mo (39) 
and ,~4 is a solution of 
I dJ@4 (1) [I (4J,(t)(t,) + ff'ck,(t)(.,)ds) 4~. 
__ Y, * J" [;~2(t)Cp (Gp:tpGp) 'Cp;~(t)c~, q~2]~-,~, (40a) 
~4(0) = 0 VO,,O2 e C(T; M2(T; ~"¢)). (40b) 
Proof. Here the last term of the r.h.s, of (37a) is derived, because the remaining parts are easy 
consequences of the filtering theory. From the definition of inner product in MZ(T; X), it follows 
that 
{// }{;( E [I:FdW(T),(al] [I:FdW(z),(o~] =E (a~(t)(tt) 
) ~ ) 
j-' ) f0(  ,)} + dp~(t)(s)ds, FdW(z) × :(t)(tr)+ 2(t)(s)ds, FdW(r r 
[] 
Now defining 
: ( t )  = \6~( t ) / '  
state estimate quations (34) and (35) are represented by 
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After tedious calculations, it can be checked that N,(t, r) satisfies all the conditions stated in 
Section I. under the condition for N,(i. t)-gain which satisfies same conditions stated in Section 1. 
The right-hand side of (42) obviously depends on N, and thus (42) gives the first relation 
connecting N,, and ,V,. Interchanging the roles of the players, another relation between l?i, and N, 
is obtained. it should be noted that this relation is derived from the necessary condition for 
optimality. 
5. REPRESENTATION OF THE GAIN OPERATORS 
The control and filter gain operators ,x;‘(f) and ,t(r) have integral kernels. In this section, we 
explicitly derive equations satisfied by the kernels corresponding to the operator .X,( t ). Schwartx’s 
kernel theorem implies that .X/(/) is represented by 
” X,‘(I)C$J = 
i 
K,(t,s,crM(t)(a)da +K,(r,s. ‘,)$(t)(l,) 
0 
+ K,(t..s,O)$(t)(O). vcj E C( 7; W( T; HI). (43) 
From the definition of inner product in M’(T; H), the 1.h.s. of equation (29a) can be written 
X5 
(PI.42 1 
;, + s u 0 ‘liK,(:;i.s,(i)~,(t)(o)do +~“‘((~t.‘.O,Q,(r)(o) 0 
We find, therefore, that equation (29a) can be represented by nine differential equations. However. 
we can readily derive the following equalities: 
K,(t. s. 0) = K;(t, 0. s) 
K,(t, .s. tr) = Kl”(t. t,, s) 
: 
for 
O<t<t, 
0 < s < t, 
(45) 
K,(t.O,t,)=K:(t,t,,O) J 
where .‘*” means that for d,, 4z E W and for fixed t, s, 
Wh, 44 = Cd+, 4 42). (46) 
Hence, we need to obtain explicitly only six of these differential equations. Now. we list 
representations of all terms of the r.h.s. of (29a): 
[<A/,4,3 .C(rk#%>l= <e,(t)(t,)3 
s 
“K:(t. s. t,)#2(t)(.s) ds 
0 
+ K:(t. t/> t,M,(t)(t,) + K:(t, 0, t,Mz(t)(O)) 
j 
‘; 
+ <A/m4,(t)(a). ” K:(t, s. cr)qi,(t)(.s) ds + K:(t, t,, a)&(t)(t,) 
0 s 0 
+ K:(t. 0, a&(t)(O)) do, (47) 
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I" 
[(AI.,4~=, Jf*(t)q~, )] = (A4)=(t)Ur), K,U, tt, a)4~,(t)(a) da 
do 
+ g,(t, tr, rj-)q~,(t)(tr) + K,(t, tr, 0)q~,(r)(0)) 
f~ r" + (AL,(o~(t)(s), K~(t, s, ~)~b,(t)(a) da + K,(t, s, tl)4~(t)(tl. ) 
+ g,(t, s, 0)qS,(t)(0)) ds 
257 
(48) 
[;o' 1 BeI., N¢(t,a)C~b,(t)(a)da, J~ff*(t)~b2 
(r" {( i" ) + BJ,~N~(t,a)Cech,(t)(a)da, K~'(t, tr, tt)+ K*(t, tl,z)dr 49=(t)(tr ) 
\do  
IBel.,f'N~(t,a)C~492(t)(a)da, o.~(t)(a,] 
~"( ;:{ f" } ) = , BJ.N¢(t,s)C~¢2(t)(s). Kl(t, tl.a) + Kl(t,'c,a)dr ¢~(t ) (a )da  ds (;' {( £" ) + Bfl,.,N~(t, s)Ce42(t)(s ) ds, Kl(t. tf' (r) + K,(t, r, tr) dr 4,(t)(tl) 
( ;" ) }) + K,(l, tr,O)+ K,(t,T, 0) dr 4,(t)(0) , 
(49) 
(50) 
( {f~'( f" ) = (R*Rp) I×B*  Kt(t. tt,a)+ Kl(t.r,a)dr 4h( t ) (a )da  
+(K,(t, tr, t f '+~tJK,(t, , ,t f 'dr)~l(t,(tf ,+(K,(t,  tf  O,+~'/K,(t,T,O)dr)(at(t)(O)}, 
( r" ) }) ×(a2(t)(tf)+ K*(t,O. tf)+ K*(t,O.r)dr q6z(t)(0 ) (51) 
do H,, 
and 
[zq52, ZqS,] = [I,,,Q(a2, I.,/Q49,] = (q52(t )(t/.), Q*Q49,(t )(tl ) ) (52) 
d 0 H. 
(.,j (.,j 
= / | (4~t(t)(a), I, oC*N*(t, a)R*l~Ne(t, s)CeI,.~(oz(t)(s)) ds da. 
3o do 
(53) 
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Consequently, from (29a), (44)-(53), we can derive the following equations: 
(~K,(Ss, ~) 
- \ ot ¢" ¢~/ 
= (AI~,4,, K*(t, s, a)4)2 ~ + (A!,,q52, K,(t, s, a)4), ) 
(( ;" ) - KL(t ,O,a)+ K, ( t , r ,~)dr 4, ,Bp(R*Rp) 'B*  
( f~ )) x g*(t,s,  tD+ K*(t, s, r) dr ~b2-(~,,L~C*N*(t,~)R*RcN~(t,s)Cd,,4)~) 
in O<t<t f ,  O<s<O and 0<~<0,  VqS~,q52eV 
(g~(o ,  s, a )q~,  az)  = 0 on 0 < s < t~ and  0 < ~ < t I 
0) 
y 
=(AIs,4~2,K~(t,s,O)4~)+ Bd, sN~(t,s)Co(a2, Kj(t, ti, O)+ K,(t,z,O)dz (an 
(( ; ) -- Kl(t. t1-,O)+ K,(t, r, 0) dr (~1, l ( ,, ) )  Bv(RpRp) B v K~(t,s, t l)+ K*( t , s , z )dz  (b 2 
! 
dt  
in 0<t< 0 and 0<s<t / ,  Vq~l,~b2eV 
(Kl(o,s ,O)~b~,q~2)=O on 0<s<t  r with K~(t , s ,O)=K*( t ,O ,s ) ,  
(~K, ( t ,  s, O) ,  , , 
- \ ~ e  ~-q'' q,.) • , 
= (.A1.4)2,Kl(t.s, tr)~bl) + (A~bj.K, (t,s, i)(a2) 
+(Bd,,N~(t,s)C~¢2,(K,(t, tr, t~)+f"K,(t,~,tj)d')cb,) 
in O<t< b and O<s<t  I VC~l,~)2eV 
(Kt(tj, s, t¢.)~b l, ~bz) = 0 in 0 < s < t; with Kl(t, s, t~) = K~(t, re-,s) 
(~_~,~,,o,,,~ )
- \ ~t 4>,, 4>~ 
(( ;" ) =(AC/)l,K'~(t,O,t~)c/)2)- K~(t,t/ .t /)+ K~(t,r ,o)dr gP~, 
( f," )) Bp(R*Rp) ~B* K*(t,O, tr)+ K*(t, 0, Odz  ~b~ in 0<t<t /  YqS~,~2eV 
(K~(te, 0, te)~bt, ~bz) = 0 with Kt(t, O, t~) = K*(t, t~. O) 
(54a) 
(54b) 
(55a) 
(55b) 
(56a) 
(56b) 
(57a) 
(57b) 
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(OK,(t, O, O) , , "~ 
- V -  
(( ) =-  K~(l, tf, O)+ Kl(t, z, O) dT 4)~, 
dt 
( r" )) , i , K* ( t ,O ,  K* ( t ,O , r )dz  4): B~(R~ R o) B o t~) + 
dt 
(K,(tf, O, 0)4)1, 4)2) = 0 
in O<t<tr  V4),,4)2eV (58a) 
(58b) 
and 
/8K~(t, tf, tf) ' I 
- ~- - -~t - -  4)' 4)2 
/ 
= (A4) 2, Kl(t, tf, tf)4),) + (A4)t, K*(t, tftf)4)2) 
(( ;) ) - -  K,(t, tl, t l )+ Kl(t,z, ty)dz 4),, 
( r s )) Kl(t, - I  , Bp(Rp Rp) Bp tf) + J' K*(t, tf, r) dr 4)2 + (4)2, Q*Q4)O 
in 0<t<t  c V4)1,4)2eV (59a) 
(Kl(tf, t i, tf)4)l, 4)2) = 0. (59b) 
By using the similar technique mentioned above, the gain operators ~,U:(t), ~(t) ,  and r~(t), 0~(t) 
can also be represented by means of the kernel equations. 
6. CONCLUSION 
Under the assumption of the existence of saddle point in the class of linear controls, we have 
explicitly solved stochastic pursuit-evasion i finite dimensional differential games. As in [1], one 
can give a sufficient condition for the existence of saddle point for our situation as well. 
This condition essentially says that, for R~ j and Re ~ sufficiently small, a saddle point always 
exists. This is not wholly satisfactory and obtaining a more explicit condition in terms of the system 
parameters i highly desirable. 
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